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For the past 50 years agriculture in the developed world could be described by the 
following stylized facts: 1) the declining real price of agricultural output; 2) the 
movement of labour out of primary agriculture; and 3) low measured returns to 
resources employed in agriculture.  As a result, almost all developed countries provide 
considerable support and protection to the agricultural sector to correct for perceived 
market failures and to transfer income to a sector that appears to be chronically plagued 
by low returns.  The result of these market trends and policy responses has given us a 
21
st Century agriculture, in the developed world, that is highly capital and energy 
dependent.  It has also given us an agricultural sector that has grown dependent on the 
transfer of funds from taxpayers and consumers to underpin farm asset values.   For a 
brief period in the mid-1970’s the world faced rapidly rising primary commodity prices 
that exacerbated inflation and briefly changed the policy debate from “farm” to “food” 
policy.
1  We appear to have entered another such period although opinions are mixed 
as to whether we are facing a protracted period of rising real food prices, or a temporary 
spike in prices similar to the one in the 1970’s. 
 
The policy situation for agriculture in the developing world differs greatly from that in the 
developed world.  First, while consumers in the developed world spend 10-15 percent of 
their incomes on food it is not uncommon for food expenditures to reach 50 percent in 
the developing world (FAO 2008).  Second, primary agriculture in the developing world 
remains labour intensive.  Third, most developing countries have to cope with a large 
fraction of their population that can be characterized as the “urban poor”.  As a result, 
agricultural policy in developing countries has often involved explicit or implicit taxes on 




While it is impossible to summarize world agricultural policy in two paragraphs and the 
reader can no doubt think of exceptions the descriptions given above are useful in 
understanding the way international institutions have evolved and their role in the 
current food crisis. 
 
 
2.0   THE ROLE OF THE WTO 
 
Beginning in 1947 the developed world began a long but steady journey towards 
multilateral trade liberalization under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).  To a large extent agriculture was excluded from the liberalization 
process until the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that began in 1986.  It is worth 
recalling that in 1986 grain and oilseed prices were at record lows; corn prices on the 
Chicago futures market were $US59/mt, soybean prices $178/mt and wheat prices 
                                                 
1 Older Canadians will recall the heated exchanges between the late Beryl Plumptre who headed the 
Canadian Food Prices Review Board, for 28 months beginning in May 1973, and then Agricultural 
Minister Eugene Whalen. 




US$92/mt compared to US$155/mt for corn, US$505/mt for soybeans and US$275/mt 
for wheat in June 2008.  The world was holding more than one-third of a year’s 
production of wheat in storage and more than 40 percent of a year’s production of corn 
in storage.  The developed world was engaged in the competitive subsidization of 
agricultural exports in an attempt to dispose of products no one wanted.  Developing 
country exporters were caught in the cross-fire of a battle between developed country 
treasuries.  This was all taking place against a backdrop of huge budget deficits in 
Canada and the United States and rapid growth in spending on the Common 
Agricultural Policy in the EU.  The level and massive growth in spending on agriculture, 
in all three nations, was unsustainable. 
 
As a result, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations were launched in the fall of 1986 
and the liberalization of agricultural trade was at the top of the negotiating agenda.  Rich 
countries wanted an international agreement to improve market access and to put limits 
on export and domestic subsidies.  For the most part developing countries shared in 
these goals although there was some concern for the least developed food deficit 
countries that might face higher import prices as a result of the agreement.  After eight 
years of difficult negotiations the UR was brought to a close with an Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) that put limits on domestic and export subsidies, provided some 
additional market access but more importantly put in place a framework for future trade 
liberalization (WTO 2003).  The Uruguay Round also resulted in the creation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the first round of trade negotiations under the 
WTO was launched in 2001 (Doha Development Agenda (DDA)).  Again, agriculture 
has figured prominently in the negotiations with developing countries feeling the 
disciplines on rich country agricultural policies introduced in the AoA have done little to 
open markets for developing country agricultural exports.  Developing countries are 
looking for considerably larger concessions from the developed world during the DDA.  
The “pillars” of the agricultural negotiations contained in the AoA were maintained in the 
DDA; namely, 1) export competition; 2) domestic support; and 3) market access. 
 
Why is all this ancient history important?  It is important because the WTO sets the rules 
for trade among countries.  As the rule setting body it would seem reasonable to expect 
the WTO to specify how nations are allowed to react during a “food crisis”.  As will be 
discussed below the WTO does have rules governing what members must do when 
they impose trade restrictions in response to higher world market prices but these rules 
are very weak and impose few constraints on what a member is allowed to do.  This 
outcome could only result from two possible conditions: 1) member nations could not 
agree upon appropriate rules; or 2) most members did not think it was important to have 
any effective rules.  Given 50 years of declining farm prices it is possible that not many 
members considered rules to govern trade during high price periods to be an important 
item on the negotiating agenda. 
 
Before turning to a discussion of the “rules” it is useful to document the crucial policy 





The typical trade and domestic policy instruments such as tariffs, export subsidies, 
market price supports, and deficiency payments have the effect of: 1) lowering world 
market prices; 2) raising domestic prices for producers; and 3) making domestic prices 
more stable and world market prices less stable. 
 
When world prices increase it is a signal that producers should produce more and 
consumers should restrict consumption.  For the most part the policy instruments 
mentioned above are not a problem in this “high price” environment because domestic 
counter-cyclical price/margin support policies will typically “disengage” as prices go up, 
or in the case of a tariff amplify the price increase. 
 
In a high price environment it is a different set of policy responses that are problematic.  
Perhaps the most extreme policy response is an export ban.  Export bans on rice by 
several major rice exporters resulted in world rice prices increasing more than they 
would have in the absence of the bans.  In addition, the announcement of an export ban 
by a significant exporter is a signal of a food shortage and can result in panic buying 
and hoarding both in the home country and abroad, making a bad situation even worse.  
Why would a traditional exporter ban exports?  Generally, it is to make the commodity 
available to the urban poor at a lower price and to save tax dollars where consumption 
of the commodity is subsidized.  Unfortunately, it sends a negative signal to producers 
in the home country and can result in smuggling from a country where exports are 
restricted to one where they are not.  Export restrictions are partial bans and have the 
same market effects as a ban but the negative effects are somewhat muted. 
 
Export taxes can also be used to restrict exports and from a taxpayer’s perspective 
have the advantage of raising revenue.  Many developing countries use export taxes to 
provide “effective protection” to their domestic processing industries (Houck 1986).   
Brazil has imposed an export tax on soybeans for years to encourage the processing of 
soybeans in Brazil, and the export of oil and meal rather than beans.  Still, when export 
taxes are raised to 65 percent as Brazil did on soybeans it has much the same effect as 
an export ban.   
 
Another policy response often used by developing countries in a high price environment 
is to lower applied tariffs.
3  In most situations the unilateral lowering of an applied tariff 
would be applauded.  Unfortunately, when it is done when world prices are high it 
results in more consumption and less production in the home country, causing world 
prices to increase even more.   Perhaps this would be a small price to pay if the applied 
tariff remained at the new lower rate, but WTO rules allow the importer to raise its 
applied tariff when prices moderate – again sending exactly the wrong market signal 
when world prices decline.  In these examples, an importer is using changes in its 
applied tariff to mute world price signals. 
 
                                                 
3 The level of bound tariffs is what is negotiated in the WTO but many developing countries apply tariffs 
well below the bound rate.  Countries are allowed to adjust their tariffs as long as they do not exceed their 




The FAO (2008) conducted a survey of 77 developing countries and discovered that 
about 50 percent have reduced tariffs in response to higher food prices, 55 percent 
have used price controls or consumer subsidies to reduce the transmission of world 
prices to domestic consumers and 25 percent have imposed some type of export 
restriction.  Only 16 percent of the countries took no policy action.  On average, only 
about one-third of world price changes have been allowed to pass-through to domestic 
producers and consumers in the FAO’s survey of developing countries.  
 
 
3.0   WTO RULES ON EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
 
What are the current WTO rules governing a countries response to higher world market 
prices?  This turns out to be a fairly complicated question.  The starting point is Article 
XX (part (i) and (j)) of GATT 1994 General Exceptions which states that as long as the 
measures concerned do not result in “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination among 
countries, or a disguised restriction on trade” countries are allowed to use measures: 
 
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure 
essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during 
periods when the domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as 
part of a governmental stabilization plan; provided that such restrictions shall not 
operate to increase the exports or the protection afforded to such domestic 
industry,… 
 
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short 
supply; provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that 
all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of 
such products…     
 
The next stop is Article XI (part 2(a)) of GATT 1994 General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions which states that the general prohibition on the use of export restrictions 
does not apply if: 
 
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party. 
 
Finally, these general provisions were modified by Part VI, Article 12 of the AoA which 
deals with Disciplines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions.  It states that when a 
Member institutes a new export prohibition or restriction on food in accordance with 
Article XI (2a): 
 
(i) the Member instituting the export prohibition or restriction shall give due 
consideration to the effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members’ 
food security; 




(ii) before any Member institutes an export prohibition or restriction, it shall give 
notice in writing, as far in advance as practicable, to the Committee on Agriculture…   
Interestingly these provisions do not apply to developing country Members, unless the 
measure is taken by a developing country Member which is a net-food exporter of the 
specific foodstuff concerned.  While GATT/WTO legal scholars could debate the exact 
constraints these rules put on Members it seems clear that countries are able to do 
what they want and face only a rather weak reporting rule.  
 
There is an opportunity to strengthen the rules on export restrictions during the DDA.  In 
fact, in Canada’s initial negotiating position on agriculture announced in August 1999 
(AAFC 1999), well before the formal start of the DDA, Canada indicated that it would 
seek agreement on rules to effectively discipline export taxes and export restrictions on 
agricultural products.  Canada argued it would seek “a ban on the inclusion of food aid 
and feedstuffs in national security trade embargoes; and a ban on export restrictions 
that would reduce the proportion of the total supply of an agricultural product permitted 
to be exported compared to the proportion prevailing in a previous representative 
period.”  Still in a WTO background document prepared in early 2001  it was noted that 
only five countries had explicitly mentioned export restrictions in their negotiating 
proposals (WTO 2001b).  To provide a flavor of these proposals Switzerland (WTO 
2000a) argued for the elimination of all export restrictions on agricultural products and 
the binding of all export taxes at zero; Korea (WTO 2001a) argued for more effective 
disciplines on export taxes as did the Cairns Group (WTO 2000b); Japan (WTO 2000c) 
tabled a more comprehensive proposal to convert all export prohibitions and restrictions 
to export taxes that would be bound and reduced, plus the development of rules that 
could be used in the application of emergency measures; and the United States (WTO 
2000d) argued that export taxes used to gain a competitive advantage or for supply 
management purposes should be eliminated.
4  It is impossible in this brief note to 
chronicle the entire negotiating history of export prohibitions and restraints, except to 
say it does not appear to have been a negotiating item given much attention. 
 
Chairman Falconer’s Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture tabled on 19 May 2008 
represents the outcome of nearly seven years of negotiating activity during the Doha 
Round and what most observers feel is close to the final negotiated text.  Section V (c) 
deals with Export Prohibitions and Restrictions.   The new rules would augment Article 
12 of the AoA by adding provisions that would require Members to
5: 
 
-  Eliminate any existing prohibitions and restrictions in foodstuffs and feeds under 
Article XI.2 (a) of GATT 1994 by the end of the first year of the implementation 
period. 
-  Any new prohibitions and restrictions under Article XI.2 (a) should not normally 
last more than 12 months. 
                                                 
4 Export taxes are illegal under the U.S. Constitution. 




-  Members should notify the Committee of Agriculture within 90 days of the 
measures coming into force, and the Member should provide the reasons for 
introducing and maintaining the measures. 
Essentially, the notification requirements contained in the AoA would be strengthened 
and the restrictions time limited but the use of export prohibitions and restrictions would 
remain largely unconstrained.  
 
Why should this matter to Canada?  Canada is one of the most trade dependent 
countries in the world.  As such, it is in our best interest to have food importers turn to 
the international market to meet their food security needs rather than pursuing import 
substitution policies.  Nothing destroys an importers faith in the international 
marketplace more than an exporter who slams the sales door shut during periods of 
tight supplies.  The developed countries of the world should pledge not to use export 
prohibitions, restrictions, embargoes or export taxes on food.   
 
How to deal with export prohibitions and restrictions from the perspective of a 
developing country is more difficult.  It is useful to break the discussion into developing 
country food exporters and developing country food importers.  For a developing 
country food exporter high commodity prices hurt the urban poor however from a 
macroeconomic perspective the terms of trade are likely to move in the exporters favor 
and the government might be able to afford the higher cost of short-run food subsidies 
for the urban poor.  The situation for the developing country net food importer is 
considerably more desperate because not only do they face the cost of feeding the 
urban poor but also declining terms of trade.  In an environment of rapidly rising food 
prices and declining terms of trade; printing money is often the only policy option; 
followed by inflation, political unrest and self-sufficiency policies.  
 
The WTO needs to develop export restriction policies that would apply to developing 
countries that would discourage “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies, most likely by binding 
and reducing export taxes and through some sort of “sharing” agreement. 
 
The negotiations in the DDA have also resulted in a new set of rules that would apply to 
food aid.  The primary purpose of the new rules is to discourage countries from using 
food aid as a disguised export subsidy – supplying large quantities of food aid during 
periods of low international prices and restricting the supply of food aid when prices are 
high (Cardwell, Fridfinnson and Rude 2007).  There is also agreement that Members 
should move towards providing untied cash-based food aid and food should be 





When high prices or natural calamities result in starvation and political unrest in the 
developing world emergency food aid is the best short run response.  However, over a 




to function to help alleviate food shortages rather than making them worse.  Given 
Canada’s trading position we have a huge stake in getting these rules right.  Although 
the future of the Doha Round is unclear there is still time to make a start on developing 
better rules for export prohibitions, restrictions and export taxes that would serve the 
world better in times of shortage.  A first step would be effective disciplines on the use 
of export taxes, and export restrictions and embargo’s. 
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